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to exploit all the gains from trade. When this is the case, one is certain that the results do not hinge upon arbitrary exclusions of security markets but rather only upon assumptions concerning preferences, endowments, technologies, and the information structure. In any event, one gains a better understanding of existing arrangements. In an analogous way, the constructs of the paper may prove useful in verifying for a particular set of contractual or institutional arrangements and economic environments that there are no potential gains from instituting other arrangements. We also hope these constructs might help us to better interpret reality.
As noted, our general analysis allows for more than one underlying consumption good and more than one consumption date and thus allows the usual intratemporal and intertemporal motives for trade. We recognize, though, this level of generality may make it difficult to interpret the constructs we have developed in the paper.5 Thus, in Section 6 we present a simple example economy with one consumption good and one consumption date and focus entirely on uncertainty and the insurance motive for trade. For this economy, the competitive equilibria are characterized by insurance contracts with options, the exercise of which is private information dependent. In addition, the equilibrium contracts incorporate contrived randomness, even though all agents have convex preferences. We argue that such contrived randomness is not unusual, being consistent with casual observations on security markets and the state-contingent analysis of Arrow and Debreu. We also show that a simple institutional arrangement with random allocation of "excess demand" achieves the competitive equilibrium allocation, suggesting that at least some apparent disequilibrium phenomena can be interpreted as institutional or contractual arrangements that support equilibrium allocations. (Section 6 is virtually self-contained and may be read before the more general analysis of the paper.)
THE GENERAL SECURITIES MODEL
Imagine an economy with a continuum of agents and I commodities. Each of the agents has an endowment vector e,> 0 in each period t, t =0, 1,..., T. Let ct denote the nonnegative consumption vector in period t; then each agent has preferences over consumption sequences as described by the utility function E E U(ct Ot) t=O 5 Despite the apparent generality, the analysis is limited in two ways. First, we do not allow for random, privately observed shocks to endowments, though we suspect our analysis can be extended in that direction. Second, we do not allow for statistical dependence in the preference shocks, so that agents would have private information on the probability distribution of future shocks at the time of initial trading. Current efforts in Prescott and Townsend [1982] indicate that extensions of standard competitive analysis to such environments are not straightforward.
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Here E is the expectation operator with respect to the random variables c, and 0, (the latter random variables will be described momentarily). Each singleperiod utility function U(., Ot) is continuous, concave, and increasing and is defined for c_>0. The parameter Ot is interpreted as a shock to individual preferences at the beginning of period t, observed only by the individual agent. For simplicity, parameter Ot is assumed to take on only a finite number of values; that is, for each t, 0 e-0 where 0 has n elements. Fraction H A(0,) of the t=O population have shock realization (00, 01,..., OT). The individual agents at the beginning of time 0 know their own 00 but have no basis for forecasting their future O, except that they know the fractions of the population that will realize each shock sequence. Consequently, by symmetry, the predictive probability distributions of all given agents for their future preference shocks are identically and independently distributed, with A(0) for 0 e 0 being the probability that t= 0.6 We note that the class of economies under study is quite similar to those studied by Gale [1980] and Lucas [1980] .
What is the appropriate commodity space for a given economy? One approach is to follow Arrow [1953] and Debreu [1959] and index consumption ct for each individual by (00,..., 0,), the individual's specific history. There is a problem with this approach, however. There may be incentives (gains) for agents to enter into lotteries even though they are all risk averse. In the example of Section 6, lotteries are needed for optimal and equilibrium allocations. This arises because the space of shock-contingent consumption allocations restricted by the incentive constraints is not convex. The following simple version of the model demonstrates this nonconvexity.
Suppose T= 1, eo = 0, and I = 1, so there is consumption of the single good only in period t = 1. Suppose also that the set 0 -{1, 2}. For the shock-contingent indexing approach, let c(0) for 0=1, 2 denote consumption in period one of a 0-type agent. The expected utility of allocation (c(1), c(2)) in period zero is then ,(1)U(c(1), 1) + )(2)U(c(2), 2).
There will be truthful revelation of shock (types) only if These are the appropriate incentive-compatibility constraints; they insure a type-one agent weakly prefers c(1) to c(2) and a type-two agent weakly prefers c(2) to c(1). To see that (2.1) and (2.2) do not define a convex set, consider allocations (c(1), c(2)') and (c(1), c(2)") that both satisfy constraint (2.1) with equal-5 ity, that satisfy constraint (2.2), and that have c(2)'A #c(2)". Given the strict concavity of U(., 1), any convex combination of these two allocations violates constraint (2.1). With consumption lotteries contingent on 0, the nonconvexity is overcome. Suppose for simplicity that the underlying commodity space is finite; that is, c can be one of a finite number of possible bundles in C. Then let the vector x(O) be a random assignment to each agent of type 0, where x(c, 0) is the probability of bundle c. Then a shock-contingent random allocation (x(1), x(2)) can be achieved in a direct-revelation mechanism with truth-telling only if 
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It is linear in x so the utility function is concave in that argument. This, incidentally, is true whether the underlying utility functions U(?, 0) are or are not concave.
With classical general equilibrium analysis (in finite dimensional spaces), there is no need for lotteries, for the constraint sets are convex and the utility functions concave. Relaxing either of these assumptions results in the possibility of gains from lotteries.
We now return to the more general model and prepare to establish the existence of Pareto optimal and competitive equilibrium allocations and the optimality of competitive equilibria using a commodity space that contains consumption lotteries. To simplify the notation, however, we assume T= 2; this is the smallest T that fully illustrates the nature of the analysis. Also, for technical reasons, we assume that et>>O, that consumption is bounded, O<ct?b, and that the U(., ?t) are strictly increasing. Finally, for notational convenience, let 0= {1, 2,..., n} and denote 00 by i. Now we may refer to agents of type i, i= 1,..., n, classified 'by their initial shock.
There are obvious generalizations to the model we analyze. There can be statistical dependence in the 0, t>1, as long as there is independence from the initial parameter 00. There can be nontime-additive-separable utility functions, discounting, observable heterogeneous characteristics, and nontrivial production technologies. We did not seek generality in order to focus on private information and how general competitive analysis can be extended to include it.
To begin the formal analysis, denote the underlying consumption possibilities set by C= {c E RI: 0 < c?< b}. Let the commodity space L be the space of (1 + n+n 2)-tuples of finite, real-valued, countable-additive set functions on the Borel subsets of C. For element z=[zo, {Z1(O1)}01E, {Z2(01, 02)}01,02C-]e zO is the measure on the period zero consumption good vector, the z1(01), of which there are n, are measures on the period one consumption vector conditioned upon 01, and Z2(01, 02), of which there are n2, are measures on the period two consumption vector conditioned upon both 01 and 02. The space L is linear, a property which is needed for standard general competitive analysis. Further, the space L contains the space P of (1 + n + n2)-tuples of probability measures or lotteries on Borel subsets of C, which are needed for the reasons noted above.
The consumption set and preferences are defined first. For x e P, the utility functional for a type i is the expected utility The endowment of agent i in each period t is an i-dimensional vector e0>>O, et E C. So let 4 be that element of P such that 40 puts all mass on eo, 41(01) puts all mass on e1 for each 01 Ec 0, and 42(01, 02) puts all mass on e2 for 01, 02 E 0.
We now have a pure exchange economy defined by the population fractions A(i), i E 0 = {1, 2,..., n}, the linear space L, the common consumption set XcL, the common endowment 4 E L, and preferences W( *, i) defined on X for every agent of type i, i E 0.
An implementable allocation for this economy is an n-tuple (xi) with xi e X 7 for every i which satisfies the resource constraints in each period t, t =0, 1, 2,7 (2.6) (i) cxio ( by choice of the n-tuple (xi), xi E X, subject to the resource constraints (2.6)-(2.8) and the prior self-selection constraint (2.9). To establish the existence of a solution to the problem, we make use of the theorem that continuous real-valued functions on nonempty, compact sets have a maximum.
To do this, we use the weak topology on the space of signed measures. Let the topology on L be the weak topology. The underlying commodity space C is a compact subset of RI, a separable metric space, and so the set of probability 8 E. C. PRESCOTT AND R. M. TOWNSEND measures PDX is compact with respect to this topology.8 Since the resource constraints (2.6)-(2.8), the prior self-selection constraint (2.9), and the constraints (2.4)-(2.5) are all defined relative to integrals of bounded continuous functions, the constraint set is closed. It is, therefore, compact because it is a closed subset of the compact set P. The constraint set is nonempty because xi-= for all i is feasible. Since continuous real-valued functions on nonempty compact topological spaces achieve a maximum, a Pareto optimum is guaranteed to exist.
The above argument relies heavily on the compactness of C.9 In fact, this assumption is crucial. By modifying the example of Section 6 where C is not compact, we have produced an environment in which one can get arbitrarily close to but not attain the utility of a full-information optimum; for that environment, then, a Pareto optimum does not exist.
EXISTENCE OF A COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we establish that our economy can be decentralized with a price system, that is, that there exists a competitive equilibrium. We accomplish this task by introducing a firm into the analysis, with a judiciously chosen (aggregate) production set. We then follow the spirit of the proofs used by Bewley [1972] and Mas-Colell [1975] for establishing the existence of a competitive equilibrium with a continuum of commodities. Various approximate economies are considered, with a finite number of commodities. Existence of a competitive equilibrium for these economies is established with a theorem of Debreu [1962] . One then takes an appropriate limit.
Let there be one firm in our economy with production set YcL, where Y= {y eL: (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) below are satisfied}: An outline of our proof for the existence of a competitive equilibrium for our economy is as follows. First, the underlying commodity space C is restricted to a finite number of points, the nodes of a mesh or grid on C. In this restricted economy a countably additive, real-valued set function is completely defined by an element of a Euclidean space, with dimension equal to the dimension of the restricted C. The linear space of these restricted economies is the 1 + n + n2 cross product of the Euclidean space. Consumption sets, preferences, endowments, and a production set may be defined on this space in the obvious way. The existence of a competitive equilibrium for the restricted economy is then established using a theorem of Debreu [1962] . Then, letting the grid get finer and finer, one can construct a sequence of competitive equilibria for economies which are less and less restricted. A subsequence of these competitive allocations and prices converges, and the limiting allocations and prices are shown to be a competitive equilibrium for the unrestricted economy. We now give a more detailed argument.
The first restricted economy may be constructed in any essentially arbitrary way by subdividing each of the I coordinate axes of the commodity space C into intervals, subject to the following restrictions. First, each endowment point et, t=0, 1, 2, must be one of the nodes of the consequent grid. Second, if we let As our linear space for the kth restricted economy is a subset of Euclidean space, the price system is also an element of the Euclidean space. Thus, we may define a price system pk = {(pk(c)), (pk(C, 01)), (pk (C, 01, 02) since et>0, t=0, 1, 2. But the measure which puts mass one on the zero element of the underlying commodity space for all possible parameter draws has valuation zero under pk*. Thus, pk* .k >min pk* Xk and the second part of the condition (ac) cannot hold. Now x'* denotes the maximizing element for the ith agent type in a competitive equilibrium of the kth restricted economy. For any i, {xk*}` o is a sequence in the space of (1 + n + u2)-dimensional vectors of probability measures on the underlying consumption set C. This metric space is compact, so there exists a convergent subsequence. Since there are a finite number of agent types, it is possible to construct a subsequence of the sequence allocation {(xk*)} which converges to some allocation (xiv). This limit, (x, ), will constitute part of an equilibrium specification for the unrestricted economy.
For every restricted economy k, the price system is (4.6). Moreover, the price system may be normalized by dividing through by the sum of all the Lagrange multipliers so that in fact each Lagrange multiplier may be taken to be between zero and one. Thus, one may again find a further subsequence of the sequence of vectors {Jk} which converges to some number {t/4} with components between zero and one. Moreover, the Lagrange multipliers in {J/} must sum to one.
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In what follows, then, we restrict attention to the subsequence of economies, indexed by h, such that for every i, x'*"-xr and for every t, i It is readily verified that for a one-period economy (with period zero only) there need be no randomness in a competitive equilibrium. Agents are risk averse, and the incentive-compatibility conditions need not be imposed explicitly. In this sense, the work developed here reduces the standard competitive analysis when the information structure is private but not sequential.
THE WELFARE THEOREMS
We now turn to the two fundamental theorems of contemporary welfare economics and ask whether any competitive equilibrium allocation is optimal and whether any optimum can be supported by a competitive equilibrium. The first question has an affirmative answer. Households know fraction A(0) of the population will experience shock 0. This is the only information they have for forecasting. We assume that agents' subjective probability beliefs are that the likelihood of being of type 0 is A(0). (See footnote 6.) Finally, all agents receive endowment e of the consumption good with certainty and U'(e, 01)<02-Our first task is to determine a Pareto optimal allocation for this economy. This could be done formally as in Section 3 by consideration of a linear programming problem in the space of lotteries, maximizing the expected utility of the representative household subject to the incentive-compatibility and resource constraints. Here we find a solution to a simplified problem, one that takes into account the resource constraints only. We then modify that incentive-incompatible solution to obtain an allocation which is both incentive compatible and resource feasible and which yields the same expected utility as the solution to the simplified problem.
If 0 were public, an optimal allocation would be for type 01 to consume c* and type 02 to consume c* where c* and c* are such that marginal utilities are equated across states and the endowment is exhausted. Essentially, this is full insurance. But this allocation is not achievable if 0 is private information. Type 01 prefers the larger consumption c* to its allocation c* (see figure) . An equally good, incentive-compatible allocation does exist, but it requires contrived randomness in the allocation. If rather than receiving c* with certainty, type 02 receives c3 with probability a* = c*l/c and consumption 0 with probability 1-a*, the expected utility of type 02 continues to be 02c*j as type 02 is risk neutral. Thus, both allocations yield the same expected utility, as well as having the same per capita consumption. Variable c3 can be selected sufficiently large to insure that the expected utility of this lottery for type 01 is less than the utility of the certainty consumption c* (as in the figure). To summarize, the allocation for which type 01 individuals receive c* with certainty and type 02 receive a lottery that provides c3 with probability x* and 0 otherwise is an optimum. Further, no allocation without lotteries is optimal. We shall now argue that this optimum can be achieved in a decentralized, competitive market for insurance contracts with individually effected and private information dependent options. Imagine, in particular, that households in the economy can buy and sell contracts (make commitments) in some planning period market. Clearly, with one consumption good, unconditional promises or commitments cannot be mutually beneficial. But households want commitments to be conditional on their own individual circumstances, that is, on their own shocks 0. Of course, these shocks are privately observed. Still, suppose an insurance contract has options effected entirely by the household, once its 0 value is known. Then some insurance may be possible. Of course, the household will choose the option which is best given its individual circumstances, and thus we may suppose without loss of generality that options are such that the household announces its individual shocks truthfully. Finally, we allow options to affect random allocations of the consumption good.
More formally, then, a household is imagined to buy in the planning period market (say from a Walrasian auctioneer) an insurance contract {x(c, 0)}, c E C, 0 E 0. (Here for simplicity we suppose set C is finite, though the more-general analysis of the paper allows C to contain a continuum of values.) Under this contract, the household is supposed to announce its actual shock 0 in the consumption period and receive c with probability x(c, 0) (of course, 0 < x(c, 0) < 1 and L x(c, 0) = 1).
